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Introduction
In the relatively young realm of international environmental politics, there is a great deal
to learn about the most effective and efficient ways in which to mitigate the world's increasing
number of environmental problems. Treaties have proven to be a popular mechanism for
addressing many of these issues, yet though the number of international environmental treaties
has grown significantly in recent years, relatively little work is being done to evaluate whether or
not these supposed solutions are in fact effective. In many ways, this analysis is as important as
the establishment of treaties themselves, because without it, it is difficult to know if progress has
been made. Or, if progress is obvious, it is difficult to know what has caused it. Furthermore, it is
important to know not only which agreements are effective, but why. Knowing which elements
of an agreement positively influence actors' behavior, and under which circumstances and
conditions, not only allows us to adjust techniques to better improve the situation at hand, it
allows for other environmental problems to be addressed more effectively. In light of this, this
paper will assess the effectiveness of a specific treaty, The Convention for the Conservation of
Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), and how the factors influencing behavior in tuna regulation
can contribute to theoretical knowledge of international treaty effectiveness. Specifically, in
exploring whether the CCSBT influenced member behavior, I will examine the effectiveness of
nonbinding agreements, assessing whether an accord needs to be legally binding in order to
effectively influence actors' behavior.
The CCSBT came into effect in 1994 with a goal to "ensure, through appropriate
management, the conservation and optimum utilisation of the southern bluefin tuna" (CCSBT
1994, Article 3). Since bluefin harvests peaked in the early 1960s, harvest and population levels
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had dropped steadily due to overfishing (See Graph #1). However, bluefin management began
not with the CCSBT, but with an informal agreement between Japan and Australia, the major
fishing states, and New Zealand, that established voluntary harvest quotas (Cascorbi 2003, 14).
When the CCSBT was adopted, the fishing behavior of these states had already changed, with
catches remaining relatively close to their 1990 levels, the year when quotas had last been
adjusted (See Graph #2). As Graph #2 indicates, the behavior of these states appears to have
remained relatively unchanged since 1990, making it difficult to assess whether this behavior can
be attributed to the CCSBT or its nonbinding predecessor. While it is clear that the CCSBT did
not cause the change in states' behavior, it is possible that without it the behavior could not have
been maintained. However, in assessing the individual non-agreement related and agreement-
related factors that may have influenced this behavior, it is evident that the CCSBT itself has
done little to affect the fishing behavior of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. While there is
evidence that the CCSBT had more of an influence on members that later joined the treaty, such
as Korea and Taiwan, ultimately the CCSBT has done little to influence member behavior.
After beginning with a brief overview of terms used throughout the analysis, I will
summarize and examine the scholarly discourse on the effectiveness of nonbinding agreements.
From there, I will attempt to apply these ideas to the regulation of bluefin harvests, ultimately
setting up the argument that, based on fishing states' behavior in relation to nonbinding and
binding regulatory agreements, nonbinding agreements have merit and can significantly
influence actors' behavior, although this influence may have some limitations. I will then offer a
more in depth look at CCSBT member states' behavior in preparation for an examination of
independent variables that may, or may not, explain this behavior. In examining these variables
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and the extent to which they influenced behavior, I will illustrate that members' behavior was
not, for the most part, significantly influenced by the CCSBT. I will then examine whether the
factors that influenced members' behavior are characteristic of a nonbinding agreement,
asserting that many of them are. Finally, I will reevaluate and reiterate my findings and conclude
with a brief discussion of their significance.
Definitions
Throughout this analysis, the terms "nonbinding" and "informal" will be used to
characterize agreements in which a party's failure to comply is not grounds for judicial action
(Schacter 1977, 300). Conversely, the terms "binding" or "formal" will be applied to agreements,
such as the CCSBT, in which parties have consented to be legally bound to behaving in a given
way or to pursuing a given goal. For the purposes of this analysis, the terms nonbinding and
binding will be applied based on agreements' intentions and not on their actual capacity to
legally enforce compliance or respond to noncompliance (Raustiala 2005). The term "original
members" refers to CCSBT founders, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, while "late members"
refers to Korea and Taiwan who have since joined the treaty.
Theoretical Exploration: Assessing the Effectiveness of Nonbinding Agreements
In evaluating the extent to which fishing states' behavior was affected by the CCSBT, I
will explore the theoretical question of whether or not an agreement needs to be binding in order
to effectively influence actors' behavior. It is generally acknowledged that nonbinding accords
are often precursors to binding ones (Abbot et al. 2000, 412) and examining the behavior of
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bluefin fishing states will shed light on whether this shift is necessarily substantive or largely
semantic. To what extent are states' actions determined by the 1ega11egitimacy of the agreement
to which they are party? In terms of bluefin overfishing, did the adoption of a binding agreement
(the CCSBT) make a difference in terms of fishing states' behavior? Because the situation
involving the over-fishing of bluefin tuna has been characterized by both a nonbinding
agreement, in which members voluntarily adhered to catch quotas, and a binding treaty, which
includes members that were not party to the informal arrangement, it provides an opportunity to
address this issue.
Scholars have done relatively little in depth research specifically on the subject of
binding versus nonbinding agreements and few have made generalized theoretical assertions as
to whether nonbinding agreements are effective and under what circumstances (Mitchell 2001,
510; Brown Weiss 1997). However, many scholars recognize that nonbinding agreements have
the potential to effectively influence member behavior. Kal Raustiala, one of the few who has
engaged in this discourse, acknowledges this influence potential in noting that legality "is neither
a necessary nor a sufficient cause of change in state behavior" (Raustia1a 2005, 589-590) This
idea is echoed by Oscar Schacter who suggests that "it is possible and reasonable to conclude
that states may regard a nonbinding undertaking as controlling" (Schacter 1977, 300), and Edith
Brown Weiss who asserts that experience indicates that "countries under some circumstances
may comply with legally nonbinding instruments as well as they do with binding ones" (Brown
Weiss 1997, 1).
While scholars generally agree that nonbinding agreements have potential, what
constitutes this potential and how it compares to that of binding accords is less clear. Raustiala,
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who acknowledges that empirical examples are limited (Raustiala 2005,613), argues that
nonbinding agreements are likely to be more effective than binding ones when the situation at
hand is characterized by high uncertainty and governments are "especially cautious" (Raustiala
2005,612). If this is true, then we would not necessarily expect a nonbinding agreement to have
been a more effective option than a binding one in the case of the bluefin tuna. The problem of
over-fishing is relatively common and does not involve a great deal of uncertainty in the sense
that indicators of population decline are fairly obvious to fishing states. However, because
overfishing is a Tragedy ofthe Commons situation, the solution is contingent on the commitment
of all relevant fishing states (Mitchell 2007, 906). This may make states wary of entering a
binding agreement ifthey cannot be sure of the reliability of other actors (Raustiala 2005). Also
expanding on the idea that nonbinding accords have potential, Peter Haas notes that "if
compliance is a matter of choice, then there is little difference between whether the obligation is
nominally binding or nonbinding" (Haas 1997, 23). This assertion suggests that if states have the
capacity to comply, their actions are less likely to be affected differently by a binding agreement
than a nonbinding one. Though they may be reluctant for economic reasons, as industrialized
states, each member involved in the overfishing of bluefin tuna seems to have the capacity to
comply, suggesting that in this situation an effective agreement could be nonbinding. While
some scholars, notably realists, argue that compliance and behavior change occur largely through
coercive mechanisms such as sanctions, which are present only in binding agreements (Jacobson
and Brown Weiss 1998,542; Haas 1997,26), coercive measures are only one way to influence
behavior (Raustiala 2001,4). In light of scholarly perspectives regarding binding and nonbinding
treaties, as well as the variables influencing members' behavior, I argue that the regulation of
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bluefin tuna harvests illustrates that nonbinding agreements can be as effective as binding ones.
Examining "bindingness" as a single independent variable that explains states' behavior
is not feasible, particularly since original member behavior remained largely the same following
the adoption ofthe CCSBT. The shift between agreement types alone does not provide enough
information to accurately assert that this stagnation was or was not the result ofthe
implementation of a binding agreement. Therefore, I will attempt to examine the effectiveness of
nonbinding accords using a piecemeal approach, exploring several of the independent variables
that could possibly explain members' behavior. Assessing the extent to which these variables
explain actors' behavior, and assessing whether they are most characteristic of the informal
agreement or of the CCSBT, will shed light on the general effectiveness of nonbinding
agreements. This approach allows for the accumulation of empirical evidence as to why
nonbinding agreements have the potential to be effective and helps illustrate under what
circumstances this potential is most likely to be realized. Among the agreement-related variables
that may explain both original and late members' behavior are the availability of relevant
scientific information, harvest quotas, monitoring mechanisms such as self-reporting, and the
establishment and proliferation of behavioral norms.
Case Selection
This analysis ofCCSBT influence focuses on the behavior of two groups: original
members and late members. Original members, which consist of Japan, Australia and New
Zealand, founded the CCSBT in1993 and were party to the preceding informal agreement that
began in 1986. Late members consist ofKorea, who joined the Commission in 2001, and
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Taiwan, who joined the Extended Commission in 2002. Though other entities such as the
Philippines, South Africa, and the European Community have become Cooperating Non-
Members in recent years, their behavior will not be examined as their harvest levels are quite low
in comparison and they are not formally party to the agreement. The majority ofthe emphasis
will be placed on the behavior of original member states as they were party to both the voluntary
agreement and the CCSBT itself, as they have been party to the CCSBT for longer and thus more
supply more treaty-related, and as they do the vast majority ofbluefin harvesting. Late members'
behavior, though it is somewhat harder to analyze, will be used both to compliment the
examination of original members' behavior and provide insight, where appropriate, into the
suggested claims.
Dependent Variable
As the CCSBT seeks to influence the fishing of member states, I am using reported
harvest levels of southern bluefin tuna, both before and after the treaty took effect, as the
indicator of treaty influence. Ifthe treaty has influenced member behavior, we would expect it to
reflected in the harvest levels of member states after the adoption of the agreement. The behavior
that I am attempting to explain is the relative stagnation of original member states' total harvest
that began in approximately 1990 and continues through the present (See Graph #2). This recent
behavior reflects a marked shift in the historical harvesting practices of these states. As explained
above, beginning in 1986, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia began setting voluntary harvest
quotas (Cascorbi 2003, 14). When the CCSBT was first implemented in 1994, the harvest quotas
and total allowable catch (TAC) set by the Commission were a continuation of the (voluntary)
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1990 levels (Cascorbi 2003, 14). The change in original member behavior appears to be caused
not by the treaty itself, but by states' adherence to the voluntary and informal agreement that
preceded it. It is possible however, that the CCSBT resulted in the continuation of this apparent
harvest stagnation, although as mentioned above, I ultimately argue that it did not.
Possible Independent Variables
Tuna Population
In order to proceed with an analysis of whether fishing states' behavior was affected
differently by the CCSBT itself than by the informal agreement, it is necessary to ensure that the
observed behavior was not the result of factors independent of either of these accords. One
possible non-agreement related variable is the bluefin population. The southern bluefin tuna
fishery is a "Tragedy of the Commons" situation, which suggests that without an agreement of
some kind, state will harvest as much tuna as they are able (Mitchell 2008). If there were no
agreement or if the agreement was ineffective, and states were maximizing their harvests, then
we could expect catch levels to correlate to population levels. Given this, it is possible that
observed harvest levels by fishing states are indicative of the tuna population and that the
apparent stagnation of harvest levels is the result of a leveling in tuna population.
The United Nations estimates that approximately ninety percent of the southern bluefin
tuna population has been depleted since the 1950s (Donaldson et al. 2007). This decline is
reiterated in Graph #5, which depicts the average number of tuna retained compared to the
average number of hooks used. While the average amount of effort (number of hooks) has
remained fairly stable over the years, the average catch has dropped significantly, suggesting that
8
the population has as well. As Graph #1 illustrates, this decline in population was mirrored by a
decline in annual tuna harvests. Given this obvious historic correlation between harvest levels
and population size, if population is the cause of the stagnation in original member harvest levels
after 1990, then the amount of tuna during this time must have remained stable. However, given
the logic suggested by the Tragedy ofthe Commons, it is likely that without an agreement
inhibiting catch, states would have continued to fish to their full capacity. As a result, population
levels would presumably have decreased even further instead of remaining stable. Therefore, it is
highly unlikely that the observed behavior of member states is the direct result of tuna
populations.
Market Price
A second possible independent variable unrelated to an agreement is the price of fish. We
may expect to see shifts in harvesting behavior that correspond with shifts in fish prices. For
example, if the price of fish is high, the earning potential is high and it might make sense for
harvest levels to increase. Conversely, ifthe price of tuna decreases, harvest levels might follow.
Using this logic and the observed behavior of original member states, we would expect that the
market price of tuna would be both relatively stable from the late 1980s to the present and that it
would be low in comparison to historical amounts. There are several indicators, however, that
price is an unlikely explanation for states' fishing behaviors, including the fact that both demand
and prices for southern bluefin tuna have risen significantly in recent years (Harden 2007, AOl).
It appears more likely that prices have risen as a result ofless harvest, than it does that harvests
have leveled off because of stagnating prices. Indicative ofthis is the twenty percent rise in
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Japanese wholesale tuna prices between 2006 and 2007, which is just one example of the
market's general upward trend (Harden 2007, AOl). In fact, instead of offering an alternative
explanation, bluefin market prices may support the idea that agreements, whether formal or
informal, had some effect on states' behavior. As prices have risen in recent years, we might
expect states to avoid joining regulatory agreements that limit the amount of fish they can catch,
in hopes of maximizing their profits. However, this has not been the case. States, such as Korea
and Taiwan, have recently become party to the CCSBT despite opportunity for greater profit.
Scientific Information
One possible treaty-related independent variable is the scientific research generated by the
CCSBT on the southern bluefin fishery. It is possible that the findings of the Scientific
Committee (SC), which was established under the CCSBT to analyze bluefin population trends,
conduct research on bluefin tuna, and make recommendations to the Commission concerning the
optimal management of tuna populations, and the Advisory Panel, which has similar functions as
the SC but is comprised of external experts, have impacted the amounts of fish being caught by
member nations (CCSBT 1994, Article 9-2). Specifically, as the these groups recommend quota
levels to the Commission, based on their knowledge of populations, we would expect quotas, and
thus behavior, to reflect the scientific information generated as a result ofthe treaty. However,
this does not necessarily seem to be the case. The CCSBT quotas remained at pre-treaty levels
for several years, despite suggestions by the Peer Review Panel that quotas be lowered to take
non-member catches into account (1998 Peer Review Panel, 1). Similarly, there is much
evidence that tuna populations are still being over-fished (Mcghee 2004; Bureau of Rural
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Sciences 2006, 101), which suggests that member behavior cannot be attributed to considerable
influence from the scientific community, who presumably advises against the over-fishing of
tuna.
Even assuming that science has impacted behavior, which seems likely on some level,
especially given that management was initially established due to indicators that stocks were
being overfished (Bureau of Rural Sciences 2007, 104), it would be difficult to distinguish if this
behavior was a unique result of the CCSBT. Prior to the SC, the informal Committee of
Trilateral Scientists "had been conducting analyses and coordinating research on southern
bluefin tuna from 1982 to 1994" (1998 Peer Review Panel, 7), which suggests that scientific
influence did not change, at least dramatically, with the implementation ofthe CCSBT. Without
the adoption of the CCSBT, it appears likely that scientific research of populations would have
continued and influenced member behavior in ways similar to the SC. The apparent stagnation in
original member harvest levels does not seem to be the result of the CCSBT's emphasis on
scientific research.
Quotas
While the apparent stagnation in original member harvest levels since 1990 does not appear
to be the result of fish populations and market price, and does not seem to correlate directly with
the availability of scientific information, quotas do seem to have had a direct influence on
member behavior. As Graph #6 indicates, Japan's reported behavior in recent years correlates
directly with its harvest quotas. Furthermore, the stability in harvest levels of original member
states in general, which begins in approximately 1990 (See Graph #1), corresponds with the
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issuance of quotas, which until the 2007 halving of Japanese catch limits, remained at the 1990
levels. From 1990 to 2006, with the exception of 1998 to 2002, when agreements on quotas
could not be reached, the total allowable catch (TAC) was set at 11,710 metric tonnes for
original member states. Examining Graph #1, this corresponds roughly with the total catches
during these years. The idea that member behavior was affected by quotas is supported in that
historically, stagnating harvest levels have not been seen and are not compatible with a Tragedy
of the Commons scenario. Therefore, a limiting factor, such as quotas, must have caused this
behavior. As further proof, as is evidence in Graphs #3 and #4, Korea and Taiwan were fishing
during this period as well. This means that there were other fish to be caught and that original
member behavior is the result of regulation.
While quotas can certainly be considered the direct influence of reported original member
behavior, quotas existed under both the informal agreement and the CCSBT, making it difficult
to tell whether the CCSBT caused behavior that would not have otherwise taken place.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine other variables that can explain states' behavior, and more
specifically, can explain states' apparent compliance with quotas.
Self-Reporting
An agreement-related factor that may explain the apparent maintenance of stagnate harvest
levels is the requirement under the CCSBT that each state report the numbers of tuna they
harvest to the Commission. Requiring the reporting of each member's harvest seems as though it
would help to ensure that member states do not exceed their quotas, and in tum maintain stable
harvest levels. Jacobson and Brown Weiss contend that "sunshine methods," such as self-
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reporting, are particularly likely to be effective in situations in which the member states are both
inclined and have the capacity to adhere to the treaty (Jacobson and Brown Weiss 1998, 548).
The CCSBT is a treaty in which the original members seem to fit this mold. While it is difficult
to estimate the extent to which self-reporting can explain this behavior, the role of norms, which
is discussed below, suggests that it certainly plays a role. In 2006 Australia consented to an
independent review, which found that it has neither under nor over-reported its catch over the
years (Bureau of Rural Sciences 2006, 106). While this compliance with regulatory mechanisms
is not empirically linked to behavioral change, it does suggest that states can and do take self-
reporting seriously. That Japan under-reported its catch for approximately twenty years,
however, illustrates that self-reporting requirements are not always effective at influencing
member behavior (Bureau of Rural Sciences 2006, 105). Despite this, it seems likely that self-
reporting helped to maintain stable harvest levels. However, states self-reported under both the
voluntary regulatory agreement and the CCSBT. Additionally, states self-reported in the same
ways. For example, Japan under-reported their catch under the informal agreement just as they
did under the CCSBT. This illustrates that the self-reporting mechanism was no more or less
effective under the CCSBT than it was under the nonbinding agreement. Therefore, while self-
reporting may be a factor in the maintenance of stable harvest levels, it cannot be used to suggest
that the adoption of the CCSBT can be credited with the maintenance of these harvest levels.
Norms and Perceptions of "Appropriate" Behavior
The final independent variable that I will explore is the role of norms, which appears to be a
significant factor influencing the behavior of states. While the establishment of fishery
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management, namely quotas, was likely provoked more by science and the obvious decline in
populations than obligations on the part of states to "do what is right," it appears that the
regulation of tuna fishing resulted almost immediately in are-identification of what behavior was
considered appropriate (Mitchell 2007, 907). For example, it was discovered in 2006 that Japan
had been under-reporting its total catches for the past twenty years (Bureau of Rural Sciences
2006, 105). This means that Japan began "cheating" almost as soon as voluntary quotas were
implemented. This suggests that although it was reluctant and unwilling to change its behavior,
by intentionally hiding its actual behavior, Japan acknowledged that over-fishing had become
inappropriate. lfno norm had developed, Japan would likely not have been concerned about
violating an informal and completely voluntary accord. While perhaps the establishment of
behavioral norms did not go as far as to change Japan's behavior, at least to the extent required
by the agreements, this example illustrates the potential norms have to shape actions. For
example, from 1998 to 2002, the Commission failed to agree upon harvest quotas. However,
both Australia and New Zealand voluntarily opted to adhere to their 1997 limits. Such examples
illustrate that the observed behavior of original member states was influenced by norms and a
sense of appropriate behavior.
Edith Brown Weiss notes that nonbinding agreements "create an expectation that may shape
behavior" (Brown Weiss 1997,3). The CCSBT, which as I have illustrated is largely the same
as its voluntary predecessor, may be a manifestation of this "expectation." The establishment of
an official treaty, though it is for all intents and purposes very similar to the unofficial one, may
have in some ways solidified a standard of behavior established by the voluntary agreement. It is
this formal establishment of the norm which may have induced other states to finally become
14
party to the agreement. Mitchell notes that as nonns become stronger "it becomes increasingly
difficult to maintain an interest-based, rather than a nonn-based" approach (Mitchell 2007, 907).
As tuna fishing began to be carried out more and more within the context of regulation, states
such as Korea and Taiwan may have felt pressured to operate within that context as well.
Evaluation of the CCSBT's Influence on Member Behavior
With the exception of being a legally recognized agreement, the CCSBT is essentially a
continuation of the practices exercised by its nonbinding predecessor. Other than the likelihood
that the implementation of a fonnal agreement encouraged the accession of late member states,
there is no one characteristic of the CCSBT that suggests that member states, particularly
original member states, are behaving differently under the treaty than they would have under the
infonnal agreement. Factors that have been detennined as influences of states' behavior, such as
quotas and self-reporting do not suggest that the CCSBT has been more influential, largely
because these practices existed under the nonbinding agreement as well. In the case of nonns,
which appear to have had a significant influence on states' behavior, only the idea that the
adoption of the CCSBT signaled a solidification of a concept of "appropriate" behavior, is
unique to the treaty itself. This is not to say that the CCSBT is fundamentally flawed or even
ineffective, rather it simply does not appear to be causing most major fishing states to behave in
ways that they would not have under the infonnal agreement. Certainly, had the CCSBT had no
predecessor, we would expect it to be much more' effective in influencing member behavior.
Additionally, this is not to say that the CCSBT will not be a more effective influence on states'
behavior in the future, particularly as more institutions, such as its Trade Infonnation Scheme,
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are established to encourage transparency and compliance.
Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Nonbinding Agreements
In examining the regulation of bluefin tuna populations and the behavior of states under both a
nonbinding agreement and a binding one, it is clear that nonbinding agreements can significantly
influence actors' behavior. The primary factors influencing the behavior of original member
states, including explicit rules such as quotas (Abbot et al. 2000, 413), monitoring mechanisms
such as self-reporting, and norms can all be characteristic of a nonbinding agreement. Although
the idea that nonbinding agreements can be both legitimate and effective has certainly been
illustrated, it is important to note that certain aspects of this situation maybe more facilitative of
nonbinding agreements than those of other situations. For example, over-fishing is a Tragedy of
the Commons situation in which those causing the problem are also the ones suffering from it.
Therefore, states may be more willing to work together to solve the problem outside of a legally
binding agreement, than those in a situation where the states causing the problem are different
from those being affected by it. Additionally, the effectiveness of a nonbinding agreement
compared to the CCSBT, which by many definitions characterizes "soft law," may be
substantially different than if it were compared to "hard law," or a treaty that actively
discouraged and punished noncompliance (Jacobson and Brown Weiss 1998, x). In fact, many of
the mechanisms that make "soft law" effective may also be characteristic of nonbinding accords.
Despite such caveats, the situation discussed above ultimately provides strong evidence in
support of nonbinding agreements' ability to effectively influence parties' behavior.
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Conclusion
Overall, the CCSBT certainly did not worsen the plight of the bluefin tuna. As I have
illustrated, the treaty was at least as effective as the voluntary agreement in addressing the
problem of over-fishing. However, states' behavior under the treaty, particularly that of original
member countries, would likely have been similar under a voluntary agreement. While it is
certainly not a problem that bluefin tuna populations are regulated by a binding rather than a
nonbinding agreement, it is important to note that this situation provides evidence for the case
that nonbinding agreements can stand on their own as legitimate and effective agents of change.
As Raustiala notes, nonbinding agreements can be easier to form, as they are more casual and
may cause states and parties to look into changing a behavior that they would not normally be
willing to commit to regulating (Raustiala 2005). In this respect, nonbinding agreements may at
least be an important, and worthwhile, intermediary step in helping to mitigate particularly
stubborn or complex environmental problems. Ultimately, if we can gain an understanding of
which types of agreements work best in which situations, we gain access to more tools with
which we can attempt to effectively take on, and perhaps even solve, environmental problems.
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